1677 - The 30-ship Programme

The United Provinces and France have been at war for five years. They have been struggling for ruling the seas while the Royal Navy has fallen third. A key character, Samuel Pepys, 44 years old, convinces his peers to initiate an unexpected recovery through an extraordinary investment.

A member of the Royal Society and positioned as the mainstay at the Admiralty, he became Secretary of Admiralty in 1673 and, the same year, a Member of Parliament. His influence has grown accordingly. He is rightly considered as the expert on naval questions at the House of Commons. Henceforth he may carry on some work of larger scope and of longer view. For instance, in order to enlighten his project, five years ago, he had established the Royal Mathematical School for future naval officers ; this year, he has also instituted the naval lieutenant’s examination.

To further Pepys’ link with scholars and his insight, we may notice that he has called on two geniuses, John Wallis, a mathematician, and Isaac Newton, a natural philosopher - that is a physicist, a mathematician, an astronomer, an alchimist and a philosopher all together - on the question of underwater shapes displaying the least resistance to fluid. It seems that their works have not completed to any clear outcome so far, which can be understood keeping in mind the question intricacy. It has not daunted our man from calling on science.

The new threat for learned England appears to be no less learned France, incidentally seized by a devouring ambition under young King Louis XIV’s rule. France has multiplied the strength of its army by three and of its navy by four within the sixteen years that elapsed since the beginning of king's personal rule. It now happens to be the first world power on land and possibly at sea through its late victories on the Dutch. The situation could be even worse for England and the United Provinces, should had it dispensed with its superfluous fleet of galleys and with ship ranks unsuitable for both the cruise and the line of battle.

¤ Galleys engulf a quarter at least of the resources meant to the navy for a negligible addition of power. France refers to Italy and to Spain as cultural and political models which induces obsolete obsession for prestige, and biased views on power instruments and on strategical chessboard. As a consequence, France currently deploys two thirds of its naval resources on its Mediterranean coast.

The king of France is blatantly appealed by Spanish possessions to extend French borders to East and to North – another threat to England’s heartland. His ambition has finally ignited an all-out war from a conflict originally limited to France and the United Provinces.

Ironically, by the secret treaty of Dover (1670), England had become an ally to France in the project of attacking the United Provinces, which finally occurred in 1672. But the Dutch war hurt English public opinion. It has undermined the king’s position through malicious pamphlets using public prejudices against the Catholics, the Pope, the French, taxes... The result was a political and economical disaster, due to the expedients found by the king to finance the war to the detriment of his debtors. On the military side, it was a new humiliation : the Dutch achieved to neutralise the combined Anglo-French fleet despite its numerical advantage.

¤ The Dutch held the upper hand in four battles, at Solebay (1672), twofold at Schooneveld (1673) and at Texel (1673). The minor engagement of the French squadron, commanded by Jean II d’Estrées, 50 years old then, arose controversies. There were suspicions on English side that d’Estrées abstained from sustaining his ally on purpose – i.e. to let the Britons and the Dutch fight in a mutually-destructive action.

England finally made a separate peace with the United Provinces three years ago. France, allied with Sweden, has then faced a coalition of the United Provinces with Spain, the Holy Roman Empire of German Nations, Lorraine, Brandenburg, and Denmark-Norway.

Sweden has defended well on land. At sea, it was heavily defeated last year at Öland by the coalition of the Dutch and Danish fleets, this year at Fehmarn and at Køge bay by the only Danes.

So far France has held the strain. On land, it cannot push its initial advantage but at sea, it has come out the winner over the Dutch and Spanish navies last year, certainly owing to a piecemeal strategy which has scattered Dutch ships worldwide, on the waters of the West Indies and of the East Indies, in the Baltic sea, in the Atlantic ocean as in the Mediterranean sea.

¤ Willem of Orange-Nassau is a devious statesman, a cunning diplomat, but a poor military strategist who has rashly hazarded Dutch ships everywhere without decisively weighing in any battle zone but in the secondary Baltic area.

In the Mediterranean sea, which has curiously become the major naval theatre through the opportunity of the Sicilian rebellion against the Habsburgs, the French gained the upper hand at the battles of Stromboli and of Augusta, and decisively won the battle of Palermo (all fought last year) against the combined Spanish-Dutch fleet. Famous Admiral Michiel de Ruyter died from his wounds after the battle of Augusta.

This is the new situation when King Charles opens the session of the Parliament, advocating for the navy and asking to consider ‘how much all our safeties are concerned in it’. Discredited as extravagant on finances, he would have likely failed his argument but Pepys’ intervention, who comprehensively explained the poor condition of the fleet, the reason for that situation, the rising and threatening strength of the French navy, the needs for thirty ships, larger and stronger than the former ones to close the gap with the potential enemy, the previous failures to avoid.

¤ A call in Portsmouth of the French two-decker 76-gun Superbe after the battle of Solebay (1672) convinced shrewd observers as Deane, Pepys and the king that their own two-deckers were no match for her, so that larger ships were necessary.

Pepys strikes the right patriotic chords and wins the day. He exploits this general feeling that France is not an enemy amongst others, but the Enemy, against which the navy is the last bastion. The Parliament votes for the required thirty ships to be built at once – an unprecedented programme which requires funds equivalent to half the annual income of public power, to be spent over two years if the schedule is respected. It is so huge that the Royal dockyards cannot house it in full so ten in thirty ships are to be purchased from private yards.

There is no smaller ship in it than a 70-gun one, while the United Provinces and France have only 27 and 24 ships of this size and over respectively. Added with the 18 that England already owns, this is an unmatched fleet of 48 large ships of the line that the programme sets up. It will be the first again, by far, with a line of battle almost equalling the coalition of the second and the third navies. Pepys and his Royal partner understood that the best policy was to concentrate resources on the key ships fit to the line of battle, while, in France, Jean-Baptiste Colbert scatters money on a wide range of ships. Moreover they understood that a few larger ships spaced along the line could strengthen it as strongholds.

Then the king intervenes to complete the issue. He first makes the Lords approve the decision made at the Commons despite the control clauses which are considered by observers as an offence to him. He thereafter decides ship standardisation – an idea he has nursed for years which comes to fruition on time – in this way that ‘the number and dimensions of ports, and all the principal sizes and measures requisite to be observed in the building of a ship and fitting her with masts, yards, blocks, etc, be one and the same in every of the new ships of the same rank’. This is the Navy Board’s responsibility to determine the general layouts, the shipwrights remaining responsible for the detailed design. At last, the king also intervenes to push ship tonnages well beyond Parliament’s initial intents and specifications.

In 1672, Pepys had made John Tippets appointed as Surveyor of the Navy. Formerly Master Shipwright at Portsmouth between 1650 and 1668, now aged 56, Tippets has to supervise shipbuilding in this role. Anthony Deane, 44, a distinguished architect, former Master Shipwright at Portsmouth too, is appointed to assist him as to supervise ship design. Edmund Dummer, 26, Tippets’ assistant, a talent for designing draughts, takes charge of this portion of the common task. This is the best possible team.

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IN RETROSPECT FROM TODAY

NOTE A - About Isaac Newton and his interest in naval topics.

He will be consulted in 1694 for the Royal Mathematical School on a new syllabus, more ambitious than the initial, which was no more than could be learned parrot-wise in his words ‘whereas the Mathematicall children, being the flower of the Hospitall, are capable of much better learning, and when well instructed and bound out to skilful Masters may in time furnish the Nation with a more skilful sort of Sailors, Builders of Ships, Architects, Engineers and Mathematicall Artists of all sorts, both by Sea and Land, than France can at present boast of’. (The School is inside the Christ’s Hospital, hence the ‘flower of the hospital’.)

NOTE B - About the question asked to Wallis & Newton on the shape of hull. This is a critical question that Pepys raised, but much in advance on science toolbox in his days.

On his own, Henry Sheeres, an engineer, a fellow of the Royal Society as Wallis & Newton, introduces the experimental analysis of the hull resistance under a rather qualitative form which easily concludes on the prime importance of ship fineness. It is a bit commonplace if we dare a comment. Furthermore it does not help as the wooden structure puts a limit on length by the stresses that the hull can stand.

We must confess that the question is complex to work out at the prime scale of slick flowing along the wet surface of the hull, which implies its shape, its smoothness and its roughness – the first two being manageable at some extent. The question is even more complex if one takes into consideration (1) the variable inclination of the hull with the wind and (2) the shock of waves. It will not be solved theoretically during the age of sail, but approached empirically.    

NOTE C - About oak wood shortage.

The main issue is the tremendous quantity of oak wood required by thirty large ships – i.e. some 100,000 fully mature trees at least. Timber happens to lack for this ambitious programme. It interferes with the works of the London churches by Christopher Wren, 45 years old, and with the massive reconstructions which are still in progress after the Great Fire of London (1666).

Despite the shipwrights’ prejudices against foreign oak, imports are made mandatory. Wood shortage happens to reinforce the power of the supervision board on the shipyards.

NOTE D - On programme implementation.

Two 90-gun and six 70-gun ships will be launched on schedule in 1678. Two 90-gun and twelve 70-gun ships will be launched with a slight delay in 1679. The eight last ships – a 100-gunner, five 90-gunners and two 70-gunners – will be launched between 1680 and 1685. But this is not the lack of material which will slow down construction then, but the political situation, poisoned by the fake Popish plot, which turns to stall management of shipbuilding programme.

NOTE E - About ship size.

The ships of the programme are more numerous and larger than ever. By number and quality, this programme restores British supremacy on the seas. It will last two hundreds and fifty years, but very short setbacks.

The 100-gun is a 1,740-tonner. The 90-gun ships are between 1,400 and 1,550 tons as the former 100-gun ones, the 70-gun ones between 1,050 and 1,150 tons as the former 90-gun ones.

Britannia (1682)

167-foot long at the gun deck, 146-foot on the keel, 47½-foot broad, 17¼-foot deep – 1,740 tons

28 cannons of 7 + 24 24-pounders + 2 culverins + 28 12-pounders + 22 sakers = 104 guns

Vanguard (1678)

160-foot long at the gun deck, 142½-foot long on the keel, 44-foot broad, 18¼-foot deep – 1,480 tons

22 demi-cannons + 30 culverins + 36 sakers + 2 3-pounders = 90 guns

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NAVAL FORCES IN 1677

In the 1660s, by an outstanding effort, the French navy has sprung up from nothing to become the second naval war force in the world after the Dutch one, then, perhaps, the first lately. The Dutch achievements at war positioned their navy at the pinnacle until its late unexpected defeats against the French.

The French position is not as good as the number of ships suggests. First, the French are obliged to sustain two large fleets. Their strategic positioning favours the Mediterranean theatre which is likely a mistake in the long view. It certainly stems from the century-long struggle with the Habsburgs. Second, they lack sailors and appropriate harbour infrastructures despite Colbert’s efforts.

The British navy which is still an English one fell in the third place during the period of the two Anglo-Dutch wars. Contrary to the French one, it has men, skills, experience and ports.

The two rival fleets of Denmark and of Sweden are the fourth and the fifth respectively, after the Swedish defeats against the Dutch and the Danes. For the Swedes it is a heavy blow, having lost their three-deckers.

The Spanish navy is the sixth, after having suffered heavy losses at the battle of Palermo, carrying on its endless decline since the battles of the Armadas ninety and eighty years ago.

We mention the number of galleys but they may be counted for almost nothing in terms of military value, apart from fighting against their likes, but they weigh on expenses.

French Navy in 1677 (66 ships of the line & 25 galleys)

(a) in the Mediterranean sea (34 ships of the line & 25 galleys)

Royal Louis 1668 104 guns

Royal Dauphin 1668 100

Monarque 1668 84

Sceptre 1670 84

5 vessels 1666-71 70-78

13 vessels 1664-72 60-68

12 vessels 1659-74 50-58

(b) in the Atlantic ocean (32 ships of the line)

Soleil Royal 1669 104 guns

Reine 1668 104

Victorieux 1673 100

Couronne 1668 80

11 vessels 1665-76 70-78

4 vessels 1666-69 60-68

13 vessels 1664-72 50-58

Dutch Navy in 1677 (49 ships of the line)

The VOC fleet is not accounted there. It operates on its own behalf and cannot be considered in the overall balance of power. Its size is deterrent to any Chinese, Japanese, Malaysian, Portuguese, Spanish and even British intrusion within its business area.

Dolfijn 1667 84 guns

Hollandia 1665 82

Zeven Provincien 1665 80

Pacificatie 1665 80

Gouden Leeuw 1666 80

Witte Olifant 1666 80

Voorzichtigheid 1667 80

Vrijheid 1667 80

19 vessels 1665-72 70-78

15 vessels 1661-67 60-68

7 vessels 1654-66 50-58

English Navy in 1677 (37 ships of the line)

Royal Sovereign 1660 100 guns

Prince 1670 100

Royal Charles 1673 100

Royal James 1675 100

Charles 1668 96

London 1670 96

Saint Andrew 1670 96

Saint Michael 1669 90

Royal Katherine 1664 84

Victory 1666 82

Ruby 1664 80 (captured from the French)

7 vessels 1666-74 70-78

5 vessels 1666-75 60-68

14 vessels 1653-73 50-58

Danish Navy (12 ships of the line)

Christianus V 86 guns

Tre Kroner 1664 84

Prinds Georg 80

1 vessel 76

3 vessels 60-68

5 vessels 50-58

Swedish Navy (11 ships of the line)

3 vessels 1658-67 70-74 guns

4 vessels 60-68

4 vessels 50-58

Spanish Navy (7 ships of the line & 30 galleys)

Santiago 1673 80 guns

San Joaquin 1676 80

1 vessel 1665 70

1 vessel 1668 64

3 vessels 1662-68 50-58

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SUGGESTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Charles Ralph Boxer – Some Second Thoughts on the third Anglo-Dutch War, 1672-1674 in Transactions from the Royal Historical Society Vol 19 – Cambridge, 1969

Ernest Harold Jenkins – A History of the French Navy – London, 1973

Brian Lavery – The Ship of the Line – London, 1983

Martine Acerra, Jose Merino, Jean Meyer - Les Marines Européennes XVIIe & XVIIIe siècles - Paris, 1998 - available on the Internet

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CREDITS

John Hayls – Samuel Pepys – oil on canvas, 1666 - © National Portrait Gallery

Willem van de Velde - Britannia and other ships - oil on canvas, circa 1685 - © Royal Museums Greenwich