1678 - Fleet Wrecking

On the 11th of May, thirteen French warships run aground on the reefs of an isolated small archipelago in the West Indies.

This is the final act of the Franco-Dutch war which has seen, after the series of setbacks suffered in the North sea in 1672-74, a number of naval victories of the French against the Dutch in the Mediterranean sea, then in Africa at Gorée island, and then in the Caribbean sea. The campaign in the West Indies has been successful so far and Admiral Jean II d’Estrées, who is 54, is more than proud of his achievements at Cayenne and at Tobago.

¤ At Tobago, he fought twice against the small Dutch squadron led by Admiral Jacob Binckes, in March and December last year. The first battle is considered a victory in France, which is somewhat exaggerated : the French lost four ships, the Dutch seven, but smaller ones, and the French retreated in the end. The second battle was decisive: the remnant of the Dutch squadron was destroyed and Tobago was captured.  

A former lieutenant general in land forces, d'Estrées joined the navy ten years ago to be appointed at the highest operational rank of vice-admiral the following year. Commanding officer of the French squadron at the battles of Solebay (1672), Schooneveldt (1673) and Texel (1674), he did not achieve anything then. The Englishmen even suspected that he deliberately abstained from fighting, which was untrue. Since then he had been expecting an occasion to shine which finally came in the West Indies.

He has planned a last move to complete the campaign by a chessmate. From Saint Kitts in the Leeward islands, he orders the fleet, completed by freebooters come from their haven at Tortuga island near Hispaniola, to head for Curaçao to expunge the Dutch Antilles and win new laurels.

Admittedly, d’Estrées is presumptuous and condescending – an odious character if any. All accounts reinforce his hateful nature as the key issue instead of ascertaining navigation events. They all concur on his personal involvement in navigation – his pretence, to follow the common views and verdict.

After having left the Windward islands, d’Estrées sails on waters unknown for everybody aboard the ships, but perhaps a few freebooters who may have attacked Maracaibo with their leaders François l’Olonnois (†1669) or Michel le Basque (†1668) in 1666-67. However d’Estrées sets freebooters as scouts at the vanguard.

After four days, the fleet is sailing without having seen any land. Yet the island of La Orchila would be visible at twenty miles, Gran Roque at ten miles and the fleet is supposed to sail so as to to catch sight on them. According to a witness, the last celestial position taken sets the fleet some 60 miles North of La Orchila island at the meridian on the very day of the shipwreck. Another pilot is said to set it somewhere West of that island at the same time – a huge difference of latitude which is strange enough. Actually both positions are erroneous in longitude by far.

At nine post meridian, almost the entire fleet happens to run aground on a field of invisible reefs South of the islands of Las Aves, 100 miles West-by-North of the island of La Orchila, and 100 miles East-by-South of the island of Curaçao. They have sailed about 40 miles since meridian, which means that they likely were West of the island of Gran Roque at that time.

The archipelago of Las Aves does not even appear on the maps used by the French. The shoals expand over two miles only : this is no more than an isolated hazard. There, seven ships of the line, three freebooters and three auxiliary ships have grounded, 500 men have drowned, and Curaçao is unexpectedly safe. An extra auxiliary ship grounds the next day.

Clearly, there has been a huge error in latitude and in longitude which exceeds one degree and a half to Southwest.

The shipwreck site lies at about 150 miles from the supposed position at meridian. Since then, the fleet has sailed some 40 miles on the surface of the sea. Thus, how could d’Estrées be mistaken by some 110 miles westward? An unknown current may be the cause – unknown for the French only for, on their own, the Spaniards and the Dutch are acquainted with the Caribbean current which flows West-Northwestward exactly as the trade wind blows. It is strong enough to explain a hundred-mile drift over four days.

Likely, when d’Estrées set the position beside La Orchila, he had already crossed the longitude of Gran Roque and passed off the island by North or South – most likely by South.

Another question : how the freebooters may have run aground on waters they were supposed to know a bit? It looks strange. There are elements of answer in the comments they voice just after the disaster. First, they tell d’Estrées that navigating by the altitude – that is using celestial navigation – is not the right way in the West Indies – some gross stupidity which reveals the scope of their ignorance. Second, they give him an idea of their supposed location : they tell him that the fleet has grounded on shoals which expand over 40 miles, a feature which plainly applies to Gran Roque which has that large area of shoals around, certainly not to Las Aves, which obviously proves that they have been lost. Instead of scouting as per d’Estrées’ expectations, they have been blind followers, even placed at the vanguard.

Remains the question of the fleet formation which has been much too tight, resulting in immediate grounding of half the fleet, i.e. nine ships, plus three in twelve freebooters. Clearly a faulty decision, why did d’Estrées adopt this formation? He annihilated the Dutch forces in the West Indies at Tobago so he has no ambush to fear any longer. But does he know that there is no Dutch vessel left ? He warily expects that but who could imagine that the first naval power in the world, that is the Dutch one, has completely abandoned its West Indies at his mercy ?

There is much more to look into that affair than the only d’Estrées’ haughty temper. His decisions have gone wrong but his reasons have perhaps not been that fatuous. Responsible for the disaster, d’Estrées is blameworthy for the useless and unfortunate tight formation he ordered, for the lack of navigation information that he should have tried to collect, for the position he chose which neglected a huge drift, for not having reduced sail enough before night, and above all for the isolation in command he built around him which has prevented mutual pondering on navigation uncertainty. Shall we also hold him accountable for his pilots’ incompetency ? This is his flag captain’s opinion.

The Dutch have their own version of the plot, providing some matter for laughing… They tell that they have lured d’Estrées with three boats and that, chasing them as a thoughtless brute, he has headed for the reefs of Las Aves where he has been led to on purpose. Discovering the danger, he would have fired his guns to signal it, which the captains of following ships interpret as the sign of an engagement to be rallied… and run aground too. This version is an implausible tale but makes a splash in the United Provinces and in Britain.

This disaster must be added to the long list of misfortunes of the sea. And to the equally long list of misfortunes giving rise to tales...

The experienced Job Forant, aged about 66, is sent in situ just afterwards. He achieves to recover 364 guns out of the 484 drowned, and 3,000 cannonballs – a tour de force. His report does not clear up the conditions of the multiple shipwreck.

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NOTES IN RETROSPECT FROM TODAY

NOTE A - On the aftermath.

Ironically, Michel de Grandmont, a survivor of the disaster, a freebooter captain aged 33, gathers the remnants of the freebooter force just after the shipwreck and ransack Maracaibo the following month.

NOTE B - About d’Estrées’ career.

After a brief sidelining, he will carry on his career at the highest level, which may vaguely surprise the ones who ignore the mysteries of favour and disgrace at King Louis XIV’s court. He will become rich of the highest royal accolades – including a Marshal’s baton in 1681 and the title of Viceroy of New France in 1687 – but without enjoying the esteem of a single sailor.

NOTE C - About sailing dangers.

Out of the 209 vessels of 50 or more guns which will have served flying the French flag under King Louis XIV’s reign, 23 will be wrecked, including six in the above mentioned wreckage. There will be 36 vessels out of 291 equivalent British ones to share the same misfortune over the same period. The odds of shipwreck are about one in nine vessel which sinks owing to weather or to navigation error.

Here are the risk factors:

(1) the maps are often misleading, i.e. islands are missing or misplaced, coasts are misplaced, reefs are missing ;

(2) navigation means are inaccurate, so huge errors are common, especially on longitude ;

(3) currents and winds have to be discovered locally for they are not mentioned on flawed maps or in patchy instructions ;

(4) commanding officers may lack seamanship, the French ones at least ;

(5) ships may be poorly designed and intrinsically dangerous at sea for lacking strength or stability ;

(6) ships may be badly built or overloaded so low in water ;

(7) ships may be decayed, and prone to working & watering ;

(8) crew may be wiped out by a disease ;

(9) and sea may be cruel…