1691 - Huge War Programmes

Many ship constructions have already been ordered since the opening of this war between France and the Grand Alliance of England, of the United Provinces and of most of the states of the Holy Roman Empire of German Nations, including Austria and Brandenburg, joined by Spain last year. Yet the late French victory near Beachy Head has exacerbated arms race.

The defeat of the Anglo-Dutch fleet led by Arthur Herbert, earl of Torrington, against Anne-Hilarion de Costentin, comte de Tourville, has created much thrill. It also raised some right anger in the United Provinces where people consider that the Dutch squadron, terribly exposed to French fire, has been betrayed and abandoned by Torrington.

¤ The Dutch squadron lost seven large ships, one during the battle and six during the chase - a heavy blow. The Dutch alone bore the brunt of French pursuit, their ships being burnt to prevent capture. The two English squadrons lost only one ship. The French fleet, none.

Furthermore, nobody in England or elsewhere could believe that coalesced English and Dutch fleets would not get the upper hand over, or at least resist to, the French one. Torrington, 42 years old, was jailed in London Tower then court-martialed for that failure before being finally acquitted.

England was in panic last year. People thought they were on the brink of an invasion. There was nothing to fear as the French had prepared neither troops, nor transports.

John Evelyn, in his diary for 1690

The real winner of the day was King William III, 41 years old. He was able with his army to cross the sea left empty by the French and to defeat ex-King James II at the battle of the Boyne the day after Beachy Head. His fleet was still existing and even patrolling the Channel two months later hence deterring any project of invasion that the king of France may have envisioned for the near future.

Having understood that his twofold navy had no reserve against the French one, William asked this year the Parliament 'to think of some fund for building some new men of war for the safety of the kingdom'. Hence the Commons decided to finance, after three 70s last year, a programme of twenty-seven ships, of two sorts : seventeen 80s and ten 60s. Members of Parliament seem to have decided by themselves which sorts of ships were needed by the navy, from a source of information which may be Torrington's address to the Commons on the supposed strength of the French fleet which defeated him - a gross overstatement.

¤ Torrington reported 82 French ships of the line, and stated in his address that 'seventeen were three-decked, most of the rest from 60 guns upward, very few of 50 guns'. Actually Tourville had 70 ships in the line : two 100s, five 80s, nine 70s, fifteen 60s, thirty-two 50s and seven 40s. Off the line, he also had five 40s and eighteen fireships. The allies set 56 ships in the line : two 100s, seven 90s, one 80, twenty-one 70s, eleven 60s, eleven 50s and three 40s. Off the line, they had one extra 70, six 30s and four fireships. To sum up, the French had seven three-deckers against ten ; they were also outnumbered in the proportion of 24 against 33 as for the 70s and 60s ; they largely outnumbered the allies by their many 50s and 40s in the proportion of 39 to 14. The overwhelming French fleet has been a tale.

¤ Torrington's defence also emphasised that the English navy was not strong enough to fulfil the many duties that weighed in on its ships of the line, requisitely scattered on several war zones. It was partly true. He could have been objected to, first, that arbitration between needs was within his field of competence as the First Lord of Admiralty ; second, that his lack of engagement worsened battle conduct and increased adverse odds for his seconds in command, Cornelis Evertsen at the vanguard and Ralph Delaval at the rearguard, who engaged their squadrons with much gallantry. The two other war zones were entrusted to (1) Henry Killigrew, in charge with 15 ships of neutralising the French Mediterranean squadron - he failed and let Châteaurenault's 10-ship squadron fly away towards Tourville - and to (2) Cloudesley Shovell, in charge of the Irish squadron of seven ships to secure transport of troops to Ireland. Shovell's squadron was easily decisive in the gap left by King Louis XIV's decision of concentrating naval forces to ensure a victory in the Channel.

¤ What about the Dutch ? William has also been stathouder of the United Provinces since 1672 and has urged rearming. The French threat drove the adoption in 1682, with a complement in 1685, by the Staten-Generaal - that is joint Senate & Parliament -, of a large shipbuilding programme still in progress. The five admiralties jointly decided to build three-deckers for the first time. So far thirteen 92-gun three-deckers have been built from a 20-ship plan, eleven 72-gun two-deckers from a 28-ship plan, ten 62-gun two-deckers from a 24-ship plan, and seventeen 52-gun two-deckers from a 24-ship plan - a tremendous naval force.

Beachy Head was an expected victory on the French side. Did it result from confidence in the Colberts' sound administration ? Did it result from intelligence reports about the relative weakness of the main Anglo-Dutch fleet ? Did it stem from the French victories against the Dutch in the 1670s ? Did it stem from the initial half-success of François Rousselet, marquis de Châteaurenault, against Herbert, Torrington by now, in the battle of Bantry Bay two years ago ?

¤ At Bantry Bay, Herbert had nineteen ships : three 70s, five 60s, five 50s, six 40s. Châteaurenault, twenty-four : four 60s, twelve 50s, eight 40s. No loss. Herbert had left mutinied ships at harbour, which explains his numerical disadvantage.

Beachy Head raises many questions. Here are the two main ones : Why no plan had been made by the Royal strategist and his advisors to harness foreseen control of the Channel ? Why did Tourville keep the line order to the detriment of swiftness in the decisive hour when the Anglo-Dutch fleet was fleeing in a dire condition ?

The first one unveils a serious question of Royal proficiency and raises an underlying question of strategy. The campaign of Beachy Head had no apparent goal but a trophy - a demand relayed and apparently amplified by the Secretary of State for the navy, Seignelay, 39 years old, in unequal competition with Louvois, 49, in charge of an army already covered of laurels.

¤ Initially Louvois disposed of resources which were eight times those allocated to the navy. Under the necessity of war constructions, the proportion has diminished to six or so. Overall military expenses amount to half the state revenue and are growing. It is even worse in England which outlays something as three quarters of the state revenue for its army & navy. English administration was temporarily unsettled two years ago by the Glorious Revolution, hence unpaid seamen's wages and ensuing mutiny.

Ireland was a strategic zone, left by Louis to William, despite James' throne at stake there. Why ? If we may venture a possibility, it seems that Louis had no offensive spirit despite the appearances, that are the aggressive reunions of the 1680s and the infamous ransacking of Palatinate two years ago. He was merely building and reaching a defensive position behind Vauban's 'ceinture de fer' and some glacis before it. Twenty years ago, his ambition had blatantly been to reach the Rhine and to conquer Spanish Netherlands. His current ambition seems to be now to contain enemy off the borders he delineated. The campaign of Beachy Heads proves the void of any naval strategy in this context.

The second question concerns Tourville's mindset. He was left unaware of any war plan for his fleet but encountering the enemy, for good reason : there was none. From his letters to Seignelay, it seems that he perceived primacy of defensive and envisioned his mission as preventing the Anglo-Dutch fleet to act upon French coasts. Entrusted with the whole naval force to win laurels for his king, his main concern was perhaps not to compromise naval strength for the future. He did not run extra risk hence did not deliver checkmate. Thus Torrington succeeded in fleeing and saved most of his fleet - and his head besides.

¤ English experts are understanding about Tourville's dilemma. They see several issues in the pack pursuit - issues as exposing ships erratically under the threat of extra blows far from any shelter. They do not know but can imagine that Tourville had consumed much of his powder and cannonballs, and that he had many men killed or wounded. It seems that one sixth were killed or wounded. The most damaged ships could not be left apart with decimated crews.

Psychologically, it is also worth noting that Paul Hoste, 39, a Jesuit priest, chaplain of Tourville's fleet, has just privately published a Traité des évolutions navales which stems from Tourville's instructions and conceptions ; it reveals how much keeping the fleet in order of battle in line and columns holds on Tourville mind. Too much, maybe ?

¤ Victorious in an useless and frustrating victory, Tourville was relieved of his command. All laymen in the court, that is everybody to make it short, concurred to malign his behaviour - his supposed spinelessness. They carry on this year. Tourville is somewhat unsettled henceforth.

On the Anglo-Dutch side, the overall lessons of Beachy Head have been plain to draw : reinforcement of the line of battle, establishment of a new leadership and search of a revenge. In the detail, it may be more complex. For instance, there is an increasing number of experts who think that the 50-gun ship could be the multiple-purpose warhorse apt to any mission. Their influence is reinforced by the prospect of cost-effectiveness. As usual, the devil is in the detail : a 50-gun ship carries some twenty 12-pounders, twenty 6- or 8-pounders and ten 3- or 4-pounders - no shot that may entail any damage to the planking of a 100-, 90-, 80- or even 70-gun opponent. Fortunately for the navy, Torrington has impressed in Parliament's minds that larger ships were necessary, hence the seventeen 80s.

On the French side, on the contrary, there is no doubt on the direction to take as for shipbuilding : many three-deckers have been ordered and are under construction. Yet there is much wavering about navy's role in the war. Thus the instructions delivered to Tourville, reinstated in his command but undermined by distrust, by the new Secretary of State, Louis Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain, 43, have defined a piecemeal mission, a collection of whims and wishes, that is, chiefly : (1) to seize a large convoy of merchant ships, (2) to capture the Scilly islands, and (3) to prevent the Anglo-Dutch from acting against the French coasts.  The latter item is consistent with French overall strategy this year. With a 68-ship fleet, Tourville succeeds in seizing part of a convoy from Jamaica and in luring the 86-ship Alliance fleet in the Atlantic ocean, far from French coasts. The outcome is congruent with the given instructions, skilfully carried out, but it does not satisfy the court for its lack of panache and of blatant outcome.

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LINK WITH A PREVIOUS CHRONICLE

1677 - The 30-ship Programme

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IN RETROSPECT FROM TODAY

NOTE A - About French strategy in the aftermath.

In 1692, King Louis XIV and Pontchartrain order the same Tourville to do a rematch of the Beachy Head campaign by adding, this time, troops and transports to invade England and to restore James. Yet, this time, the Mediterranean squadron fails to unite and, in addition, men lack to crew twenty extra ships in Brest, so Tourville must make do with 44 ships from Brest and Rochefort. He faces 82. Tourville, obliged to engage whatever the odds by a Royal whim, nevertheless succeeds in getting the upper hand against Edward Russell, 39 years old, at the battle of Barfleur. The aftermath is a disaster : twelve damaged French ships are destroyed by fireships at anchor around La Hogue. It will be a turnpoint in war strategy and in naval architecture which deserves a specific chronicle.

NOTE B - About the Traité des évolutions navales.

Paul Hoste will finally publish it together with a treaty of architecture in 1697. we will examine it within a chronicle.

NOTE C - About the 80s ordered by the programme.

The 80-gun two-decker is an unfortunate design. The Parliament demanded a one seventh increase in armament upward from a 70 but allowed a one tenth increase of tonnage to room it - a mismatch to the detriment of ship qualities. To solve it, the four last 80s are made three-deckers, slightly broader and bigger than the two-deckers.

NOTE D - On the contribution of private shipbuilders.

The programme exceeds the Royal dockyards capacities. Eight in seventeen 80s and eight in ten 60s are ordered from private yards - a premiere, not very successful. It will push the Controller of the Navy, Edmund Dummer, to improve Royal Dockyards and to set new methods of measurement to control execution.

NOTE E - On programme implementation.

The thirteen 80-gun two-deckers were launched in 1692-95, the four three-deckers in 1695-98, and the ten 60s in 1693-97.

The 27-ship programme is not the only one of the period. Aware of the strength of the French fleet, Parliament funds five series of warships : three 70s in 1690, eight 50s in 1693, eight more 50s, four more 70s and four 90s in 1695 - and, in addition, eighteen 50s ordered one by one - forty-five ships. Together with the 27-ship programme, it makes a grand total of 72 ships of the line. Nine rebuilds are also funded : three 100s; three 70s and three 50s. Overall the English navy gets 81 new ships to take place in the line of battle, among which we can find 11 three-deckers.

NOTE F - About the French construction of ships of the line in the same period.

The French build four 104/112-gun ships, eighteen 84/94-gun ones, nineteen 60/76-gun ones, and seventeen 50/60-gun ones - 58 new ships, including 22 three-deckers. We can understand English Parliament's diligence facing such a threat. Torrington's allegations become true in the end : France builds big ships in this second phase of construction of its navy while England builds relatively small. It is worth noticing that Pontchartrain is, as Colbert was before him, both secretary-of-state for the Navy and controller-general of Finances, especially skilful in the second office.

There is much to say about the blatant difference in the distribution of resources between France and England. We will see that in details in a chronicle on the war turnpoint.

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SUGGESTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alfred Thayer Mahan - The Influence of sea Power upon History 1660-1783 - New York, 1890

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CREDIT

Unknown Painter - Comte de Tourville - oil on canvas, circa 1695 - © Musée de la Marine

Thomas Murray - King William III - oil on canvas, 1691 - © National Portrait Gallery