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1697 - Paul Hoste's Masterworks

  • Luc CHAMBON
  • Jun 17
  • 9 min read

Updated: 4 days ago

a later edition of Hoste's treaty
a later edition of Hoste's treaty

Paul Hoste, a Jesuit priest and a mathematician, aged 45, publishes two masterworks : L’Art des Armées Navales ou Traité des Évolutions Navales and Traité de la Construction des Vaisseaux. The first one is especially original and even foundational.

Hoste's career looks like Georges Fournier’s one, sixty years ago. They both are Jesuit priests and mathematicians. They both became chaplains for the Atlantic fleet, so scholars scrutinizing ships and observing manoeuvres, as well as admiral's lunch guests and discussion partners. Yet Hoste has leveraged the potential of his privileged position much higher than Fournier, to a new summit in naval thinking.

Hoste begun as a teacher of Mathematics for future officers - a career that is testified by his Recueil des Traités de Mathématiques (1692). He has got some naval experience at sea from 1685 to 1697 as a chaplain of fleets commanded by Jean II d’Estrées, earl of Estrées, by Louis-Victor de Rochechouart, duke of Vivonne and of Mortemart, and by Anne Hilarion de Costentin, earl of Tourville.

¤ From his own records and comments within L'Art des Armées Navales, Hoste was aboard Tourville's flagships at the battles of Beachy Head (1690), of Barfleur (1692), and of Lagos (1693). He went along with the admiral at sea from 1689 to 1693. The masterworks issued this year stem from this unique experience and have been written under Tourville's behest.

There has been a special bond between Hoste and Tourville. These two outstanding men shared curiosity, creativity, and a common passion for a wide range of naval questions, from ship architecture to tactics patterns. They spent much time together, at least throughout the campaigns of 1690, 1691, 1692 and 1693. There is no doubt that Tourville taught Hoste in a first step and supplied him much food for thinking. There is no doubt either that Hoste developed his own thoughts and produced a general theory wrapping and deepening Tourville's practical reflections.

At the time of their daily exchanges, Tourville was very busy with two major tasks. First, he was influencing the plans of the next ships of the line under construction at Brest. It is said that he impacted at least one of the new giant vessels, namely Foudroyant, Terrible, and Soleil Royal.

¤ The first one was built by Étienne Hubac, who expressly mentioned Tourville's intervention in the design. The other two were built by Blaise Pangalo. Foudroyant swapped her name with Soleil Royal after the destruction of the first vessel of this name. This second Soleil Royal (1692) therefore is the ship partly designed according to Tourville's views. It seems that Tourville intended to make the builders streamline the hull, lower the poop, diminish tumble-home, and slightly change the arrangement of the batteries. His main goal was to get a better gun platform by reducing pitch and roll. It is quite difficult to recognise real Tourville's impact on ship's features. The shipwrights had themselves evolved on their own and anyway would not have duplicated the ships designed by Laurent Hubac, Étienne's father and designer and builder of the first Soleil Royal.

Second, he was editing and improving his signal books for the campaigns. The first edition was issued in 1689, and completed from year to year to a wide set in 1693.

¤ There, we have a mismatch between his signal books and what he actually succeeded in doing. We cannot recognise the signals appropriate to initiate the skilful fleet manoeuvres that Tourville effectively made his fleet carry out under stress, under enemy fire, and in the confusion of a melee, at Beachy Head, Barfleur and Lagos, as they are reported by Hoste. There is obviously a missing portion in his instructions, at least the ones burnt in 1692 in his two successive flagships Soleil Royal and Ambitieux. One may wonder if the Hoste's manuscript of 1691, which remained private in officers' hands, which was handwritten while Tourville's influence on Hoste's mindset was at its peak, would not contain the elements necessary to a full understanding of the admiral's set of instructions. Hoste, in this first depiction of fleet manoeuvres, may have acted, if not as a ghostwriter, at least partly as a secretary for Tourville.

Naval Evolutions

As mentioned, Hoste already wrote on this topic in 1691 but it seems that his work has just been circulated to Tourville's captains for their usage at sea.

This second version exposes the subject in depth. This is certainly the first time that this question of seamanship and of tactics, supposed to be the field of practice, is approached on a theoretical basis. Yet this is not an eccentric view elaborated ashore but the result of a direct observation from the quarterdeck. In his foreword, he especially thanks Tourville, 55 years old now, for his help and advice. It seems that Hoste’s work specifically bears witness of Tourville’s fruition from long thinking on the topic. Yet Hoste developed it.

Hoste describes the ‘ordres de marche’ which are the fleet patterns appropriate to different situations. A large section deals with the changes of pattern depending on wind. There are a large number of illustrations which depict the geometry of the moves. He comments, delivers the pros and the cons, and assesses the power of the arrangements. He also exemplifies through depictions of battle phases of the late wars. This is really a powerful book, very clear despite its 424 pages.

Hoste uses examples of manoeuvres attempted or completed by contemporary admirals, as Tromp, Ruyter, Blake, Prince Rupert and the Duke of York.

Hoste's treaty under its original form
Hoste's treaty under its original form

We can retrieve questions that have been pivotal in Tourville's mindset : keeping the line, preserving the line when manoeuvring, restoring the line further to battle events, adapting the line to battle context. From all records, Tourville relied on the line to maintain fighting capabilities at their top, possibly at the expense of fastness and of seizing opportunity.

For instance, Hoste mentions 'Regrouping to Leeward' as a manoeuvre achieved in the approach to Beachy Head, or 'Skewed Line' as a manoeuvre completed in the thick of the same battle. He also points out 'Reforming the Line' as a manoeuvre achieved to restore order in the damaged fleet in the afternoon of Barfleur, or 'Orderly Retreat' as a manoeuvre partly completed in the evening of Barfleur - we all know that fifteen ships failed to remain in the line and to cross the strait of Alderney Race. Hoste labels 'Approach in a Curve' as a manoeuvre achieved at Lagos.

Hoste pushes the question of naval tactics well in advance on contemporary English instructions. One may consider that he is very cautious, imbued with a defensive attitude, almost discouraging any attempt of breaking the enemy line, but under exceptional circumstances. However this an unique collation of fleet manoeuvres.


Shipbuilding

On ne peut pas nier que l’art de construire les Vaisseaux, qui est si nécessaire à l’Estat, ne soit le moins parfait de tous les arts. Les meilleurs Constructeurs ne bâtissent quasi qu’à la vuë les deux principales parties du Vaisseau, scavoir l’avant & l’arrière : d’où il arrive que le même Constructeur, bâtissant en même temps deux Vaisseaux sur les mêmes modelles, les fait le plus souvent si inégaux qu’ils ont des qualités toutes opposées.

Paul Hoste

Everything is said in these two first sentences in the form of an indictment.

Hoste observed that some vessels were complete lame ducks, and he inferred that naval architecture was still a lottery due to a lack of mastery of key features. He saw that it required the introduction of methods - his purpose in collating principles. He is not a naval architect and never designed a real ship. The master shipwrights will certainly be interested in his views as the contribution of a scholar to their trade.

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LINKS WITH PREVIOUS CHRONICLES

1693 - A Turnpoint in French Strategy

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IN RETROSPECT FROM TODAY

Note A - on Hoste's impact on naval warfare thinking

What an extraordinary genius prevailed amongst the French in Louis XIV's reign, to push up everything to the summit of perfection. They had no sooner created a great Navy in that reign (for they never had any before), to the astonishment of all Europe, as at that time they had scarce any commerce at sea... that they had the quickness of discernment immediately to see (what we have never been able to see yet) the great advantage that would result in sea fights from a system of naval tactics... They judiciously perceived that military tactics might be adapted to naval tactics in the arrangement and evolution of fleets. They set to work about it, and completed it so well as to exhaust the subject, and so were as astonishingly rapid in perfecting the discipline and manoeuvres on a fleet as they were in forming one;

Admiral Richard Kempenfelt, in 1780, then looking into improving British Signalling System


The whole system of tactics that he develops is based, like Russell's, on the single line ahead and the independent action of squadrons. The passages in which he elaborates the central battle idea of concentration by doubling are as follows: 'The fleet which is the more numerous will try to extend on the enemy in such a manner as to leave its rearmost ships astern, which will immediately turn [se repliera] upon the enemy to double him, and put him between two fires. Remark I.—If the more numerous fleet has the wind it will be able more easily to turn its rear upon that of the enemy, and put him between two fires. But if the more numerous fleet is to leeward it ought none the less to leave its rear astern, because the wind may shift in the fight. Besides, the fleet that is to leeward can edge away insensibly in fighting to give its rearmost ships a chance of doubling on the enemy by hugging the wind. Remark II.—I know that many skilful people are persuaded that you ought to double the enemy ahead; because, if the van of the enemy is once in disorder it falls on the rest of the fleet and throws it infallibly into confusion.' And by the aid of diagrams he proceeds to show that this view is unsound, because the van can easily avoid the danger while the rear cannot. To support his view he instances the entire success with which at the battle of La Hogue, Russell, having the superior fleet, doubled on Tourville's rear.
'To prevent being doubled,' he proceeds, 'you must absolutely prevent the enemy from leaving ships astern of you, and to that end you may adopt several devices when you are much inferior in number.
'I. If we have the wind we may leave some of the enemy's leading ships alone, and cause our van to fall on their second division. In this manner their first division will be practically useless, and if it forces sail to tack upon us it will lose much time, and will put itself in danger of being isolated by the calm which generally befalls in this sort of action by reason of the great noise of the guns. We may also leave a great gap in the centre of our fleet, provided the necessary precautions be taken to prevent our van being cut off. By these means, however inferior we be in numbers, we may prevent the enemy leaving ships astern of us. Example.—Everyone did not disapprove the manner in which Admiral Herbert disposed his fleet when he engaged the French in the action of Bevesier [i.e. Beachy Head] in the year 1690. He had some ships fewer than ours, and he had determined to make his chief effort against our rear. That is why he ordered the Dutch leading division to fall on our second division. Then he opened his fleet in the centre, leaving a great gap opposite our centre. After which, having closed up the English to very short intervals, he opposed them to our rear, and held off somewhat with his own division so as to prevent the French profiting by the gap which he had left in his fleet to double the Dutch. This order rendered our first division nearly useless, because it had to make a very long board to tack on the enemy's van, and the wind having fallen, it was put to it to be in time to share the glory of the action.[3]
'II. If the less numerous fleet is to leeward, the gap may be left more in the centre and less in the van, but it is necessary to have a small detachment of men-of-war and fireships so as to prevent the enemy profiting by the gaps in the fleet to divide it.
'III. Others prefer to give as a general rule, that the flag officers of the less numerous fleet attack the flag officers of the enemy's fleet;[4] for by this means several of the enemy's ships remain useless in the intervals, and the enemy cannot double you.

Julian Corbett, Naval Historian and Strategist, quoting and commenting Hoste

Hoste's treaty will be republished and will remain a reference book, in France and in Britain, until 1780.

Note B - on Hoste's impact on Naval Architecture

Hoste writes at a time of blatant maturation of French art of shipbuilding. The second wave of massive constructions in 1689-95 gave the master shipwrights an opportunity to improve their techniques. We may see Hoste as a scholar collating principles rather than an inspirer.

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SUGGESTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Julian Corbett - Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 - London, 1905 - available on the Internet

Brian Tunstall - Naval warfare in the age of Sail - London, 1990

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